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1 Introduction 
In April 2013 the Norwegian Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee (hereinafter, 
the EOS Committee) submitted a special report to the Parliament concerning the Police 
Security Service’s surveillance of two Muslim communities in Norway. The report 
disclosed that over a ten-year period, the Police Security Service had collected and treated 
information about numerous individuals’ religious beliefs, in a manner that was deemed 
incompatible with the rules pertaining to the information gathering of the Service.  
 
The discourse on counterterrorism surveillance in the 21
st
 Century is often described as all-
embracing and indiscriminate, premised on the notion that everyone will have to forsake a 
degree of individual rights protection in order to realize the State’s national security 
objectives. However, a concealed aspect of this intangible balance metaphor is the 
distributive implications that pre-emptive surveillance generates, where certain individuals 
and groups in society arguably become more exposed to carrying the burden of 
counterterrorism objectives.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to substantiate the hypothesis that the application of pre-emptive 
surveillance measures for counterterrorism purposes are premised on a prediction of future 
national security threats that uses ethnicity and religion as proxies for risk in order to 
identify possible perpetrators, thereby assigning individuals with a particular ethnic origin 
or religious belief to inhabit risky identities. This further raises the question of whether 
particular sub-groups in society that share such personal characteristics are more easily 
categorized by the State as suspicious, thereby constituting so-called suspect communities.   
 
Moreover, the thesis will seek to assess whether pre-emptive counterterrorism surveillance 
of individuals, on basis of their religion or ethnicity, constitutes illegitimate differential 
treatment contrary to the protection of the right to non-discrimination. Central to this 
assessment is whether such application of pre-emptive surveillance measures can be 
considered necessary and efficient for counterterrorism purposes, and whether such 
difference in treatment poses a disproportionate negative burden on certain groups in 
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society. Against this background, the research question of this thesis is how and in what 
ways does pre-emptive counterterrorism surveillance challenge the right to non-
discrimination?  
 
In order to properly address and answer the research question, the following sub-questions 
are considered imperative for inquiry in the following analysis:  
 
i. What can the discourse on balancing national security objectives with human rights 
convey about the underlying distributive implications of counterterrorism policies?  
ii. How can the concept of indirect discrimination be applied to the differential 
treatment generated by the application of pre-emptive surveillance measures?  
iii. Does pre-emptive surveillance generate suspect communities and what 
consequences could this give rise to? 
1.1 Research framework – the advancement of proactive criminal law 
The legal and political developments catalysed by the terrorist attacks in the United States 
on 11 September 2011 have been accorded extensive academic attention. The following 
section will nonetheless outline the contemporary advancement of proactive criminal law 
internationally and nationally, as it arguably serves as a foundational point of departure for 
understanding the rationale underpinning the pre-emptive counterterrorism surveillance 
framework and its identification of risk, which is at the crux of the ensuing analysis.  
 
The events of 11 September 2001 provided considerable momentum to the narrative on 
counterterrorism. Most fundamentally, the reinvigorated focus on terrorism prompted 
enactment of novel legislative measures both at the international and national level, 
pursuant to binding resolutions issued by supranational bodies such as the United Nations 
(UN) and the European Union (EU). An imperative feature of the counterterrorism 
framework has been the use of criminal law as a central instrument for providing the State 
with broader preventive tools such as pre-emptive surveillance measures.  
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Prior to 11 September 2001, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had sanctioned 
several resolutions denouncing terrorism, in addition to the adoption of the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in 1999. However, the 
terrorist attacks in the United States bestowed considerable impetus to the institution’s 
preceding counterterrorism efforts. On 28 September 2001, the UNSC issued Resolution 
1373,
1
 which encouraged States to ratify the Terrorist Financing Convention, furthermore, 
required Member States to enact laws that in part would criminalize financing and 
preparatory acts of international terrorism. The Resolution marked the first time the UNSC 
utilized its authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter by passing a binding resolution 
that Member States were obliged to implement domestically, leading commentators to 
argue that the Council acted as a global legislator.
2
 One of the primary underlying reasons 
for adopting the Resolution has arguably been to ensure harmonization of criminal law 
internationally, thereby denying terrorists so-called safe havens in certain States.  
 
The policies advanced by the UN at the international level were accompanied by the EU, 
which expedited the adoption of the EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 
adopted 13 June 2002. The Framework Decision coordinates the implementation of 
Resolution 1373, in part by streamlining all Member States’ definition of terrorist offences 
under national law.
3
  
 
The harmonization of criminal law for counterterrorism purposes at the international level 
has had notable legal and political implications: Firstly, by labelling certain acts as terrorist, 
increased penalties have been enabled. Secondly, in situations where police authorities 
suspect the commission of acts of terrorism, specific means of investigations such as 
surveillance may be warranted at an earlier stage and – specifically relevant for this thesis 
analysis – on lower grounds of suspicion. Lastly, corresponding to the recognition that 
terrorism is a global phenomenon that may transcend national borders, harmonization of 
                                                 
 
1
 S/RES/1373 (2001).  
2
 Rosand 2004 p. 546.  
3
 EU Framework Decision (2002) Article 1.   
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criminal offenses has promoted international cooperation to a greater extent.
4
 Furthermore, 
by streamlining the criminal law pertaining to terrorism internationally, a narrower margin 
of appreciation has been provided to States on how to react to the heightened threat.
5
  
 
Prior to the terrorist attacks in 2001, Norway had ratified all relevant UN conventions, the 
exception being the Terrorist Financing Convention, by amending the existing legal 
framework.
6
 Fulfilment of international agreements on counterterrorism was seen as 
sufficiently satisfied in the existing criminal law without adopting specific regulations, as 
crimes associated with terrorism such as murder or damage to property would be 
punishable under current provisions. Moreover, the use of covert coercive measures was 
strictly regulated and its scope of application limited.  
 
It has been suggested that the Norwegian government perceived the threat of terrorism to 
be of little relevance to the domestic context prior to 2001.
7
 In a Norwegian Official Report 
(NOU) from 1993, it was explicitly expressed that acts of terrorism should be regarded in 
the exact same manner as other criminal acts; furthermore, accentuating that any particular 
focus on terrorism could lead to unwanted attention to the phenomenon.
8
 However, the 
terrorist attacks in 2001 changed this cognizance considerably. In accordance with 
Resolution 1373, the General Civil Penal Code of 1902 was amended by Act of 28 June 
2002 No. 54 with the inclusion of section 147a and 147b. The former provision 
criminalises acts of terrorism and certain terror-related offenses and the latter financing of 
terrorism.
9
 Following the EU’s adoption of the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, 
section 147c was included to the Penal Code in 2008, criminalising incitement, recruitment 
and training to terrorist acts.
10
  
                                                 
 
4
 Weigend 2006 p. 913; see also Ot.prp.nr 8 (2007-2008) p. 315. 
5
 Warbrick 2004 p. 1002. 
6
 Bruce & Husabø 2009 p. 78.  
7
 Engene 2011 p. 234. 
8
 NOU 1993:3 p. 43. 
9
 General Civil Penal Code para 147a and 147b; the provisions superseded a provisional decree on the 
prohibition of terrorist financing from 5 October 2001, No. 1134.  
10
 EU Terrorism Convention (2005); General Civil Penal Code para 147c.  
 5 
Planning and preparation of a terrorist act by means of conspiracy has been criminalized, 
pursuant to section 147a, third paragraph. The requirement of conspiracy implies that a 
perpetrator enters into an agreement with one or more persons to commit a future terrorist 
act as those enumerated in section 147a, first sentence. Additionally, following the terrorist 
attacks in Norway on 22 July 2011, supported by the “never again” mantra;11 increased 
emphasis was given to the need to criminalise “lone wolf” or solo terrorism. Such 
criminalisation had been fervently opposed when debated years earlier, however, after 
considerable debates over the formulation of the provision, section 147a of the Penal Code 
was extended in 2013 with the inclusion of paragraph four, which criminalizes individual 
planning and preparation of a terrorist act, in cases where the intention to carry out the act 
is expressed by external actions. 
 
A principal aspect of the counterterrorism legislation enacted pursuant to Resolution 1373 
and the EU Framework Decision is the proactive character of the law, as it includes stricter 
and more extensive criminalisation of preparatory acts of terrorism. Criminal law has 
traditionally been reactive in nature, which entails that investigation and sanctioning occurs 
after a crime has been committed. The key element is thus the laws retrospective character. 
However, a proactive criminal law entails that acts are criminalized at an earlier stage in 
the sequence of events leading to what has traditionally been considered the commission of 
a crime. In the context of terrorism, it implies that ordinary lawful acts become criminal 
when done in preparation for a terrorist act. As a result, a fundamental objective is to detect 
criminal acts before the perpetration, signifying the preventive character of proactive 
criminal law.  
 
It is important to note that the shift does not include a development of substitution where 
the reactive paradigm replaces the existence of the proactive one.
12
 However, the proactive 
disposition of the provisions pertaining to terrorism should arguably be considered to 
                                                 
 
11
 See speech by Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg 25.07.11.   
12
 Jacobsen, 2009 p. 89. 
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represent a shift from traditional principles of criminal law, both at the international level 
and in the legal tradition of Norway that in part has novel implications for the covert 
coercive measures it enables.  
 
This is arguably evident in relation to the conduct criminalized in Section 147 of the 
Norwegian Penal Code, as the provision places stronger emphasis on the subjective 
element of the perpetrator in assessing whether certain actions constitutes criminal acts. 
The establishment of criminal responsibility thus focuses to a greater extent on the 
perpetrator’s motivation to commit a terrorist act in the future and not solely on the 
objective element of conduct.
13
 Such a composition of criminal responsibility raises several 
evidentiary questions in relation to criminal prosecution, which is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, however, more importantly for the present discussion are the practical consequences 
the law has for the utilization of pre-emptive surveillance methods in the examination of 
potentially criminal behaviour. As will be sought established in the following analysis, the 
increased focus on the mens rea element of the potential crime has arguably facilitated 
predictive assessments of future threats that to an increasing extent focuses on the personal 
characteristics of an individual, by employing religion and ethnicity as proxies for risk, thus 
creating particular risky identities.
14
  
1.2 Definitions 
This thesis is concerned with the pre-emptive surveillance practices applied by the Police 
Security Service. It thus follows that the main focus will be on the implications of pre-
emptive surveillance measures applied domestically, pursuant to Norwegian law.
15
 
Surveillance does not have one singular and coherent definition, however, a frequently 
adopted description is proposed by Lyon, who defines it as “any collection and processing 
of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or managing 
                                                 
 
13
 Hustad 2007 p. 25. 
14
 The term ”risky identites” has been utilized by Mythen et al. in relation to how British Muslims have been 
labelled as ”dangerous, risky ’others’” 2009 p. 738. 
15
 The thesis will not discuss derogations in times of public emergency. It should, however, be noted that 
Norway has not made any derogations in light of the implementation of counterterrorism objectives.   
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those whose data have been garnered”.16 Surveillance of individuals may be separated as 
either targeted surveillance or mass surveillance, where the former speak about surveillance 
of a particular person or groups, while the latter implies undifferentiated surveillance of the 
population in general.
17
  
 
The term “pre-emptive surveillance” will primarily be applied throughout this thesis in a 
context-specific manner. The context-specific definition describes the Police Security 
Service’s information gathering for preventive purposes. The registration and treatment of 
information about individuals by the Police Security Service, it be collected by means of 
open sources or covert coercive measures, entails that the individuals concerned are under a 
form of surveillance. The EOS Committee, as evident in its unclassified reports, supports 
such a conceptualisation of surveillance.
18
 While it is incontestable that the use of covert 
coercive measures is a considerably more intrusive and adversarial surveillance method, it 
will be argued that forms of information gathering that does not require a judicial order is 
also relevant to examine as these should be considered as measures of surveillance. 
Furthermore, as this study is concerned with the potentially discriminatory and 
disproportionate application of pre-emptive surveillance, the measures will be referred to 
conceptually rather than separately, unless specifically stated otherwise.   
1.3 Methodology 
Counterterrorism surveillance is a multifaceted research area, which intersects with a 
number of academic disciplines.
19
 As this thesis is concerned with the implications pre-
emptive counterterrorism surveillance has on the right to non-discrimination, an 
interdisciplinary approach is considered to be both pertinent and necessary. It is further 
deemed apposite as it arguably enables a broader conceptual and theoretical understanding 
of the questions at hand. The methodology applied is socio-legal research, employed with 
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 Lyon 2001 p. 2. 
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 Vermeulen & Bellanova 2012 p. 310. 
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 EOS Committee Special Report 2013 p. 8.  
19
 See e.g. Bygrave 2010 on the multidisciplinary scholarship of surveillance studies, p. 59.  
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the aim of going beyond a de lege lata interpretation of the relevant positive legal rules, by 
consideration of the socio-political consequences generated by the application of the law. 
The interdisciplinary approach is furthermore considered appropriate, as my personal 
academic background is not in law.  
 
The research has been conducted as a qualitative desk-study. The method of data collection 
has been document analysis of primary and secondary sources. The primary sources used 
include international human rights treaties, particularly the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), in addition to judgments issued by 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The treaties have been interpreted in 
accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), in 
addition to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Furthermore, 
relevant Norwegian legal documents such as the Human Rights Act,
20
 the General Civil 
Penal Code and the Police Act have constituted imperative primary sources. 
 
The secondary sources applied have been monographs; journal articles; official documents 
issued by UN and EU bodies; reports issued by international, regional and national 
institutions; statistical surveys; and newspaper articles. The sources have been selected and 
interpreted with consideration over their reliability and subjective inclination. In particular, 
the reports used include unclassified documents issued by the EOS Committee. While 
acknowledging that these documents do not provide an exhaustive description of the pre-
emptive surveillance practices of the Police Security Service, they have nonetheless been 
imperative for acquiring an understanding of the empirical application of pre-emptive 
surveillance measures in Norway.  
                                                 
 
20
 In 1999 the Norwegian parliament adopted the Human Rights Act, which purpose is to strengthen the status 
of human rights in Norwegian law. The Act incorporates the core international human rights instruments inter 
alia the ICCPR and the ECHR, which take precedence over other statutory provisions should there be a 
conflict, pursuant to the Act’s para 2 and 3.  
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The methodological choices of this thesis reflect the absence of reliable empirical data to 
verify or falsify the presumptions that the analysis builds upon. This scarcity arguably 
constitutes a significant methodological limitation to the arguments and observations that 
this thesis proposes. Counterterrorism intelligence encompasses, by its very nature, 
classified national security concerns and confidential material on the private lives of 
individuals. It thus follows that any research conducted on this topic will be empirically 
deficient. However, this aspect should arguably not undermine the need for academic 
scrutiny, but rather reinforce the necessity of conducting research on a topic that to a 
considerable extent is premised on classified discretionary judgments.  
 
Research conducted on the use and effects of overt counterterrorism measures, such as the 
practice of stop and search, have been examined and employed for comparative purposes. 
This approach has been chosen in order to infer and consider potential commonalities 
between the distributive implications generated by overt and covert surveillance measures 
adopted for counterterrorism purposes.  
 
Given that the data collected are qualitative, the interpretation and conclusions drawn have 
been influenced by my personal predispositions. Attempts have accordingly been made to 
increase the reliability and quality of the research by seeking to substantiate material used 
with other comparable sources, thereby endeavouring to ensure the accuracy of the applied 
data.  
1.4 Reader’s guide  
The forthcoming analysis is structured in a manner that seeks to accentuate the distributive 
implications of pre-emptive counterterrorism surveillance, by examining the potential 
challenges that such measures may have on the protection afforded by the right to non-
discrimination. A fundamental aspect of any discussion concerning the legality and 
rationale of pre-emptive counterterrorism surveillance is arguably how to establish an 
appropriate relationship between national security objectives while simultaneously 
sustaining the protection of human rights.  
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Accordingly, chapter 2 will examine how politicians have invoked the concept of balance 
as a mechanism for determining the necessary response to heightened security threats. It 
will in part argue that the concept is a misguided tool for establishing such a relationship, 
primarily because it conceals the distributive implications that the balancing model 
inevitably involves. Rather, the principle of proportionality will be suggested as a 
considerably more cogent approach for evaluating permissible limitations on human rights 
generated by pre-emptive surveillance measures. The proportionality framework will be 
carefully examined, as this arguably serves as an imperative structure for the ensuing 
analysis that assesses the potential challenges pre-emptive surveillance has on the right to 
non-discrimination.  
 
Chapter 3 accordingly introduces the scope of this right and the legal sources in which it is 
stipulated, emphasizing the legal framework concerning the protected grounds of ethnicity 
and religion. As the underlying assumptions about risks, which direct the application of 
pre-emptive surveillance measures and the effects they generate constitute pivotal issues in 
the thesis’ analysis, the concept of indirect discrimination will be examined more carefully. 
Chapter 2 and 3 should thus be understood to compose the structural parameters for the 
subsequent discussion in chapter 4 and 5.  
 
The aim of chapter 4 is to examine the extent to which the Police Security Service uses 
religion and ethnicity as proxies for risk in their assessment of potential threats, arguing 
that such categorization can be characterized as assigning individuals with risky identities. 
With the presentation of the applicable legal framework for pre-emptive surveillance 
conducted by the Police Security Service, it will be applied to assess the suitability and 
efficacy of using religion and ethnicity as predictive profiles in the attempt to foresee 
potential perpetrators. It will be argued that such predictive categorization has the 
capability to turn groups of individuals with a particular religion or ethnicity into suspect 
communities. Against this background, chapter 5 will examine the potential consequences 
of the creation of suspect communities and whether the disproportionate harm inflicted on 
these communities should be considered as amounting to indirect discrimination. Lastly, it 
 11 
will examine how membership in suspect communities can give rise to processes of 
radicalisation; thereby accentuating the counterproductive results that pre-emptive 
surveillance measures may give rise to.   
 12 
2 The concept of balance and the principle of proportionality  
Counterterrorism policies raise imperative questions over how to establish an appropriate 
relationship between the implementation of increased security measures while sustaining 
human rights protection. An elementary feature of human rights law is that the majority of 
human rights provisions are not absolute, the exception being peremptory norms. The 
qualified nature of relative human rights signifies that their realization is contingent on 
considerations over co-existing and potentially competing individual rights or public 
interests.  This inherent aspect of human rights law is expressly recognized in international 
and regional human rights instruments, manifested through limitation clauses that outline 
particular grounds that may justify a restriction, provided that certain standards are met.   
 
The legal regime of human rights is consequently structured in a manner that has the 
capacity to accommodate the State’s need to implement counterterrorism measures. 
Balancing human rights against such public interests is considered to represent a vital legal 
instrument for establishing permissible interferences with individual rights. In and of itself, 
balancing is thus an inherent aspect of legal human rights adjudication, epitomized through 
the principle of proportionality. However, within the political discourse on 
counterterrorism, a notably broader and considerably more intangible form of balancing 
has been proposed as the necessary response to questions over the compatibility between 
increased national security measures and the protection of human rights. The concept of 
balance is seen to represent a particularly pertinent metaphor for solving these issues. 
However, applying the concept of balance as a mechanism for determining how to establish 
the appropriate relationship between individual rights and the national security interests of 
the State is arguably misplaced, and should be understood as distinctly different from the 
legal principle of proportionality, for reasons that will be elaborated upon in the following. 
2.1 The concept of balance  
With the proliferation of counterterrorism policies, considerable attention has been given to 
the concept of balance as the necessary response for acquiring a suitable middle ground 
between national security and individual human rights. The concept has been invoked 
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repeatedly in debates by academics, policy-makers and legislators alike, as it is seen to 
represent a cogent approach to the legal and moral dilemmas raised in the effort to 
counteract terrorism.
 21
 Dworkin argued in 1977 that “the metaphor of balancing the public 
interest against personal claims is established in our political and judicial rhetoric, and 
this metaphor gives the model both familiarity and appeal”,22 thus serving as a possible 
explanation to the concept’s allure.  
 
However, despite the omnipresent use of the balancing metaphor, it has increasingly been 
subject to debate as several scholars have dismissed its usefulness.
23
 Central to the 
discussion is the conceptual understanding of both security and human rights, and whether 
their association is one of compatibility or conflict. The following section will propose 
three interrelated reasons as to why the concept of balance arguably is an unfitting and 
overly reductive concept for understanding the relationship between national security 
interests and individual human rights.  
2.1.1 Projects the balancing of security and human rights as a zero-sum game 
By construction, the balancing model arguably assumes conflict. This is an inherent aspect 
in the balance metaphor, which entails that the increase of one scale, automatically involves 
the reduction of the other. In the context of counterterrorism policies, this zero-sum game is 
arguably problematic partly because it adopts a conceptualisation of national security and 
human rights that presupposes that the two objectives encompass concepts that are 
mutually exclusive.
24
  
 
In order to demonstrate the false premises of the perception of national security and human 
rights as diametrically opposed, scholars have argued that this understanding ignores the 
theoretical underpinnings that the objectives rely on. Liberal political theory elucidates how 
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 Dworkin 1977 p. 198.  
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 See e.g. Luban 2005; Michaelsen 2006; Moeckli 2008; Zedner 2005. 
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security and liberty are reciprocal concepts and should, as a result not be projected as 
separated from each other. They assert that the ideology of liberalism highlights that a 
defining feature of liberal democracies is that any security measure can only be justified on 
basis of the pursuit of liberty, evoking the classical liberal view that individual freedom is a 
prerequisite for acquiring public security.
25
 Liberty and security should thus be seen as 
mutually reinforcing.  
 
Furthermore, the balance model’s expectation of an inevitable trade-off between security 
and human rights is arguably misplaced because it assumes that protection of human rights 
is a separate issue from the protection of national security. The presumption underpinning 
the trade-off argument as reflected in the balancing model negates the fact that the human 
rights regime is structured to accommodate national security concerns.  
2.1.2 Obscures the contention over right as trumps or interests  
Placing national security and human rights within a balancing model is further problematic 
because it presumes that there is a self-evident answer to what weight the competing 
interests placed on the scales should be given. This premise obscures the fact that the 
conceptualisation of rights in relation to public interests is a distinctly vexed issue.  
 
Rights theory contains a range of contrasting accounts on the relationship between 
individual rights and public interests.
26
 One can arguably identify a bifurcation within the 
discourse, which key distinction is based on the extent to which rights are to be protected 
against communal goals.
27
 While acknowledging the broadly sketched nature of the 
following classification, rights theorists concerned with these questions may be 
distinguished as advocates of a “pro-rights” or a “pro-balancing” conceptualization of 
competing principles.  
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One of the most prominent advocates of the pro-rights division is legal theorist Ronald 
Dworkin, who has famously argued for defining rights as trumps. He asserts that rights 
should have a lexical priority over other collective interests. In part, this entails that rights 
should not be forfeited on the justification of a common greater good corresponding to the 
government’s interest, furthermore, that rights are to be conceptualized as distinctly 
different from other societal values or interests.
28
 Consequently, rights should enjoy 
safeguarding to the greatest extent possible prior to taking other interests such as national 
security into account.
 29
  
 
By contrast, pro-balancing theorists do not confer a specific protection to rights as such, but 
rather consider rights to constitute fundamental interests similar to other collective goals of 
particular weight. Rights and collective goals are thus seen to have equivalent value, which 
implies that public interest may prevail over individual rights, should the public interest be 
deemed to have superior importance. Alexy illustrates this view by accentuating how rights 
are both principles and rules, best encapsulated as signifying “optimization 
requirements”.30 When two optimization requirements collide, these should be balanced 
against each other by means of a proportionality analysis. 
 
It thus follows, that theories on rights as trumps and rights as interests propose competing 
understandings of the relationship between individual rights and collective interests, in 
which the advocates of the former view perceive the exercise of balancing to erode the 
fundamental protection rights are set out to secure, while proponents of the latter highlight 
how rights and interests are commensurable values that are well-suited for resolution 
within a framework of legal balancing. The priority given to the rights and interests that are 
to be weighed in the balance is accordingly not self-evident as presupposed by the 
balancing model. Whereas some scholars would prefer that rights were protected against 
the public interest of national security to the greatest extent possible, others would assert 
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 Dworkin 1977 p. 269. 
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 McHarg 1999 p. 673. 
30
Alexy 2002 p. 388. 
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that national security ought to enjoy the same protection as rights, provided that the balance 
does not constitute a disproportionate burden.  
2.1.3 Presumes equal distribution 
A third problematic feature of the concept of balance is that it arguably conceals the 
distributive implications that are generated when a compromise is sought established 
between national security concerns and human rights. The balancing model arguably 
presupposes that everyone will be equally affected by the outcome of the balancing 
exercise. When the concept of balance is invoked in relation to counterterrorism policies, it 
involves the assumption that increased security entails equal distribution of the benefits and 
burdens attached. However, as will be more carefully examined in chapter 4 and 5, while 
the rules governing the implementation of national security objectives are stipulated in a 
neutral manner, their application may affect certain individuals or groups 
disproportionately. 
 
As a result, in the context of counterterrorism, the balancing model will necessarily involve 
normative considerations over perceived risks to national security and importantly, who are 
considered to constitute potential security threats. As pointed out by Moeckli, this aspect of 
the balance model raises the imperative question of whose rights are placed on the scales.
31
 
Several scholars note that while the concept of balance conceals this inherent feature, it is 
commonly the security of the majority that is weighed against the liberty of the minority.
32
 
This important element of the concept of balance arguably accentuates the utilitarian and 
politicized character of the balancing model.  
 
However, while utilitarian considerations arguably are misplaced from a rights perspective, 
premised on the notion that all human rights are universal and inalienable, legitimate 
objections to the above argument could nonetheless be raised from the political perspective 
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of the State. Under international human rights law, States have a positive obligation to 
protect the individuals under their jurisdictions against potential harms caused by terrorism, 
to the greatest extent possible. For that reason, political considerations over how to fulfill 
such obligations may be accompanied by utilitarian calculations over how to protect the 
security of the greatest number of people. Measures employed to realize this duty, such as 
the use of counterterrorism surveillance, may thus constitute a necessary and justified 
interference with other human rights, as they contribute to ensuring the citizens’ right to be 
free from the harm caused by terrorism. Moreover, the State may invoke individuals’ “right 
to security” to emanate from this obligation.33  
 
Nonetheless, while recognizing the importance and validity of the State obligation to 
ensure such protection, the conceptualization of security as a basic right to be enjoyed by 
individuals arguably demands recognition of the right’s ingrained distributive character. As 
asserted by Waldron, «the distributive structure of rights is egalitarian, not maximizing».
34
 
It thus follows, that an aggregative approach to security that adheres to utilitarian 
considerations of security maximization in a society must acknowledge the distributive 
implications involved when the State ensures its obligation to protect the security of its 
citizens.    
2.2 The principle of proportionality 
The following section will primarily address the principle of proportionality as applied by 
the ECtHR, as the Court’s interpretation is considered most relevant for the Norwegian 
context. The pursuit of establishing a fair balance between public interests and individual 
human rights has repeatedly been affirmed as a fundamental aspect of the ECHR.
35
 The 
ECtHR has applied the fair balance analysis to the majority of the rights enshrined in the 
instrument, thus reflecting the view that the search for a fair balance is “inherent in the 
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whole of the Convention”.36 Two of the most important functions of the fair balance 
objective are the principle of proportionality and the margin of appreciation doctrine.  
 
Under international human rights law, the principle of proportionality signifies a 
conceptual framework for assessing the justifications for restrictions on human rights and 
whether these are permissible.
37
 Any analysis concerning the principle of proportionality 
must commence by identifying the scope of the right in question and the legal limitations 
attached to it, if any, that would restrain its fulfilment.
38
 Barak argues that the scope entails 
the right’s underlying purpose, which is constant, regardless of whether other interests or 
rights are weighed against it. However, the rights of others or specific interests of the State 
may condition the fulfilment of the right.
39
  According to the traditional understanding of 
the principle of proportionality, which construction is often credited to German 
lawmakers,
40
 it embodies three separate, yet interrelated sub-principles of legality, 
necessity and proportionality stricto sensu.
41
  
2.2.1 ECtHR’s approach when adjudicating permissible limitations on rights 
The ECHR does not contain a general limitation clause, but include specific restrictions 
attached in the second paragraph to each of the substantive rights stipulated in Article 8 to 
11, which are structured in a comparable manner. The ECtHR has developed a standard 
procedure for adjudicating whether an imposed limitation on an individual right is 
permissible, which includes three cumulative criteria assessing the legality of the measure; 
the legitimacy of the aim pursued; and lastly, whether the interference was necessary in a 
democratic society. While it has been argued that the proportionality assessment permeates 
the Court’s entire interpretation of the ECHR,42 the proportionality principle is arguably 
most pertinent in the third stage. However, in order to provide a comprehensible account of 
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how the principle of proportionality is manifested in the judicial reasoning of the Court, the 
two first tests on legality and legitimacy will be provided for in the following:  
2.2.1.1 In accordance with the law 
The first criterion for establishing whether an interference is permissible requires the 
limitation to be prescribed by law. It is additionally required that the respective provision is 
of certain legal quality, which entails that the rule must be compatible with the objectives 
encapsulated in the legality principle, namely accessible and foreseeable, thereby ensuring 
compliance with the rule of law.
43
 It is thus required that the law is formulated in a precise 
and understandable manner. In the Kruslin judgment (1990), which concerned covert 
surveillance techniques, the Court stated, “it is essential to have clear, detailed rules on the 
subject, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming more 
sophisticated.”44  
2.2.1.2 In pursuit of a legitimate aim 
When the ECtHR assesses whether the interference pursues a legitimate aim, it will 
typically consider whether the aim had an objective justification. The Court has repeatedly 
stated that the fight against terrorism constitutes a legitimate national security aim, which 
implies that this criterion is usually easily satisfied in cases concerning restrictions based 
on national security.
45
    
2.2.1.3 Necessary in a democratic society 
The third and final stage of the adjudication procedure conducted by the ECtHR is the 
assessment of whether the interference is necessary in a democratic society. The Court has 
interpreted the condition of necessity to imply that the interference in question must 
”correspond to a pressing social need”,46 furthermore, that it is proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued. The Court does not as such apply the three-pronged framework of 
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suitability, necessity and proportionality for assessing the democratic necessity-test,
47
 
however, the three criteria may nonetheless be considered to be of constructive guidance 
for the present discussion.
48
  
2.2.1.3.1 Suitability 
The test of suitability will be satisfied if established that the interference in question is 
suitable or effective for realizing the legitimate aim. By consequence, this test necessitates 
an assessment over the causal relationship between the means employed and the end sought 
achieved. While the suitability requirement will be more easily satisfied in certain cases 
where the means applied for securing the aim are apparently effective, questions that are 
more open-ended and difficult to measure the efficiency of, for instance whether ehtnic 
profiling by police authorities should be considered an efficient method for protecting 
national security, are considerably more complex. While the ECtHR rarely demands the 
State to demonstrate that the measure in question is entirely effective for securing its 
objective, it will have to be established that the measure has such capacity.
49
  
2.2.1.3.2 Necessity 
The necessity criterion requires that there is no other equally satisfactory measure available 
that would impair the right to a lesser extent.
50
 This implies that should there be other less 
intrusive means at the disposal of the State that would achieve the aim sought equally well, 
the interference would be deemed impermissible. Should the State for instance adopt covert 
coercive measures when the information sought gathered could be just as efficiently 
obtained from the use of less restrictive methods, the necessity requirement of the chosen 
measure could be questioned. The ECtHR has, however, applied a necessity criterion that is 
less stringent than the “least-intrusive-means” test suggests, where the usefulness or 
reasonableness of the measure is the imperative parameters for assessment.
51
 Furthermore, 
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the jurisprudence of the Court shows that effective guarantees against abuse are considered 
indispensable, which arguably is of particular importance in relation to the use of secret 
surveillance systems.
52
   
2.2.1.3.3 Proportionality stricto sensu  
Proportionality in the strict sense requires that there is an appropriate correlation between 
the benefit obtained from the restrictive measure that limits the right and the disadvantage 
caused to the right by the limitation.
53
 It is this stage of the proportionality framework that 
embodies the balancing exercise, where the benefits and burdens of the limitation are 
weighed against each other. The strict application of the proportionality analysis will 
accordingly have to assess the effects the limitation has on the right-holder(s) and is by 
consequence a “value-laden” exercise.54 Whereas the concept of balance uncritically 
places national security and human rights on each side of the scale without further 
examination of the underpinning considerations, this criterion requires that the restrictive 
measure in question be balanced against the limited right, for the purpose of determining 
whether the advantage provided from the limitation outweighs the imposed burden.      
2.2.2 The margin of appreciation doctrine 
An imperative method of interpretation intrinsically linked to the necessary in a democratic 
society test is the margin of appreciation doctrine, which is a judge-made method of 
adjudication developed and employed by the ECtHR. It concerns the scope of discretion 
that the Court may bestow upon national authorities in their fulfilment of the obligations 
enshrined in the ECHR. Up until the adoption of Protocol 12 to the ECHR in 2013, which 
amends the preamble to the Convention with an explicit reference to how the States enjoy a 
margin of appreciation, the legal basis for the doctrine could only be found in the 
jurisprudence of the Court.
55
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A vital starting point when examining the margin of appreciation doctrine is the recognition 
of the principle of subsidiarity, which permeates the ECHR and is intrinsically linked to the 
discretion provided to States. The principle entails that the protection afforded by the 
Convention system is secondary to the implementation and protection of human rights at 
the national level, thereby recognising that national authorities are the primary duty bearers 
of enforcing and securing the Convention rights.
56
  
 
Accordingly, the margin of appreciation doctrine functions as an interpretative tool for the 
Court to “structure the area of friction between international supervision and national 
sovereignty”57. The doctrine proceeds on the recognition that the authorities of the States 
Parties may be better equipped to determine the suitable regulatory response to issues 
concerning rights protection within their jurisdiction.
58
 Accordingly, the margin of 
appreciation is an imperative analytical instrument for determining whether an interference 
with a qualified right is deemed permissible in cases where the justification for the 
limitation is based on national security.   
 
While the case law of the Court traditionally has reflected that the margin of appreciation 
afforded to States on matters of national security has been uniformly broad, recent 
jurisprudence exhibits that the discretion varies depending on the subject matter of the right 
in question and the nature of the restriction.
59
 Consequently, while the Court has stated that 
States enjoy a wide margin when determining the appropriate means for achieving the 
legitimate aim of protecting national security,
60
 the case law demonstrates that rights 
infringements justified on basis of counterterrorism strategies does not automatically fall 
within the States’ own discretion. Any assessment over whether a limitation upon a right on 
basis of national security is deemed permissible will be subject to a proportionality analysis 
as expressed above.  
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2.3 Conclusive remarks 
The aforementioned analysis of the concept of balance and the legal proportionality 
framework arguably shows that the principle of proportionality as applied in international 
human rights law, is by comparison a considerably more complex exercise of assessing 
whether an infringement on an individual right can be deemed permissible pursuant to 
national security aims. Invoking the concept of balance as the necessary and appropriate 
response to the competing interests raised by counterterrorism policies should arguably be 
avoided, as its reductive character conceals the choices that underpin the implementation of 
national security objectives and who these are directed at, thus precluding recognition of 
the distributive implications involved. The following analysis will proceed by examining 
how the right to non-discrimination accommodates differential treatment generated by 
national security objectives and consider how the principle of proportionality becomes 
manifested in assessments over the objective and reasonable justification necessitated by 
such differentiation.  
 
 24 
3 The human right to non-discrimination  
A foundational tenet of the principle of non-discrimination is that every person has a right 
to be judged as an individual and not as part of a group.
61
 Notwithstanding the prominence 
accorded to the right to equality and non-discrimination within international human rights 
law, the theoretical interpretations of the principles scope and exact content are manifold 
and often not in concord. One issue of contention is whether the two principles should be 
regarded as distinct concepts
62
 or simply as two sides of the same coin.
63
 The most 
common understanding of equality and non-discrimination in international human rights 
law is that the two concepts constitute the positive and negative expression of the same 
principle. The following analysis will proceed on the premise that the concepts of equality 
and non-discrimination may be regarded unitarily on basis of their reciprocal character. 
However, it should be recognized that the constitutive components of the right to equality 
and non-discrimination as expressed in international human rights law have separate 
functions as well as different normative underpinnings. They should as a result not be 
considered as a single norm. Moreover, given that the focus of this study centres on the 
prohibition on non-discrimination, the conceptual understanding of equality will acquire a 
less prominent role in the forthcoming analysis.   
 
This chapter will outline the legal sources on the right to non-discrimination, at the 
international, regional and national level. Furthermore, it will examine the relevant criteria 
applicable when examining whether claims of differential treatment are considered 
permissible. However, given the extensiveness of the field of non-discrimination law, the 
scope of the legal sources and their interpretation will primarily be assessed in relation to 
the protected grounds of ethnic origin and religion, as these are considered most relevant 
for the differential treatment that can arise from the application of pre-emptive surveillance 
measures. Lastly, the chapter will examine the concept of indirect discrimination as a 
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framework for assessing the potentially disproportionate effects that the application of pre-
emptive counterterrorism measures may have on groups seen to inhabit risky identities, on 
basis of their shared personal characteristics.  
3.1 Legal sources on the right to non-discrimination 
3.1.1 International law 
The principles of equality and non-discrimination are considered to be “the most frequently 
declared norms of international human rights law”,64 as their protection and realization 
have been regarded as one of the most significant objectives of the human rights 
paradigm.
65
 Provisions relating to the protection of equality and non-discrimination may be 
conceptually divided as either accessory or autonomous. With the exception of the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT), all the core UN instruments on human rights contain a broadly 
similarly worded accessory provision on equality and non-discrimination, which scope is 
limited to the application of the substantive rights set forth in the respective conventions. 
However, the legal epitome of the right to non-discrimination is arguably to be found in 
Article 26 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The article 
reiterates the accessory content of Article 2(1) in the respective Covenant, yet more 
importantly; it additionally embodies an autonomous prohibition on discrimination. The 
article reads: 
 
“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the 
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and 
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any 
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status.”66  
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It thus follows, that Article 26 encompasses a three-folded obligation: Equality before the 
law requires equality in relation to the enforcement of the law, which entails that State 
officials such as judges or administrative personnel are not to apply the law arbitrarily or 
discriminatorily.
67
 Equal protection of the law signifies de jure equality, meaning that all 
persons shall be provided with the same legal rights and duties without discrimination.
68
 
Lastly, the protection against discrimination is to be regarded as an overarching principle, 
“circumscribing the legitimacy of the laws themselves”.69  
 
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD) is exclusively concerned with racial discrimination. Compared to the protection 
afforded in the ICCPR and the ECHR, which will be examined below, the protection 
against discrimination provided in the ICERD could be considered as broader and more 
dynamic, given that the instrument regulates different positive State obligations arising 
from the provisions stipulated in the convention.
70
  
3.1.2 Regional law 
At the regional level, the ECHR provides an accessory norm on non-discrimination in its 
Article 14, which may only be invoked in conjunction with other Convention rights. 
However, the ECtHR has accentuated that the provision is accessory in scope, but 
autonomous in its meaning, which entails that the Court might find a violation of Article 
14, regardless of whether there is a breach of other substantive Convention rights.
71
 
Accordingly, potential claims within the ambit of Article 14 arising from the discriminatory 
application of pre-emptive surveillance measures could for instance be invoked in 
conjunction with Article 8 on the right to privacy or Article 9 on freedom of religion. With 
the adoption of Protocol No.12 to the ECHR, which entered into force in 2005, the 
protection against discrimination is considerably extended, as Article 1 of the Protocol 
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stipulates that the principle of non-discrimination shall apply to “any right set forth by 
law”.72  
3.1.3 National law 
Over the last decade, Norway has introduced substantial amendments in the legal 
framework on anti-discrimination. With the bicentennial anniversary of the Norwegian 
Constitution in 2014, significant constitutional amendments were made, among others the 
inclusion of a separate clause on non-discrimination stating that everyone shall be equal 
before the law; furthermore, that no human being shall be subjected to unjust or 
disproportionate differential treatment.
73
 The ICERD is incorporated in Norwegian law 
through the Anti-Discrimination Act.
74
  
 
In 2013 the Ethnicity Anti-Discrimination Act was passed, which provides protection 
against ethnic discrimination.
75
 The purpose of the Act is to promote equality irrespective 
of ethnicity, religion and belief and applies in all sectors of society, with the exception of 
family life and other purely personal relationships.
76
 The law prohibits both direct and 
indirect discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, national origin, descent, skin color, 
language, religion or belief, defining indirect differential treatment as «any apparently 
neutral provision, condition, practice, act or omission that results in persons being put in a 
worse position than others, and that occurs on the basis of ethnicity, religion or belief.»
77
 
Hence, as noted by Blaker Strand, indirect discrimination can be established without actual 
proof of discrimination, as evident in the aforementioned provision’s wording of a person 
“being put” in an adverse position than others. This indicates that indirect discrimination 
can be demonstrated if a rule of practice has the capacity to discriminate.
78
 Furthermore, 
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the Act authorizes differential treatment, provided that it has an objective purpose; it is 
necessary to achieve the purpose; and the negative impact of the differential treatment on 
the person or persons whose position will worsen is reasonably proportionate in view of the 
intended result.
79
  
 
In 2003 Norway signed Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR, however, it has not yet been ratified. 
A committee appointed by the government in 2009 discussed the issue of ratification, 
where the majority decided against it, in part by arguing that there were too many 
unanswered questions pertaining to the personal and material scope of the Protocol.
80
 It 
has, however, been suggested that the refusal to ratify the Protocol concerns the fear that it 
could generate an increase in complaints to the ECtHR and thereby limiting the political 
freedom of the government,
81
 an arguably sound proposition, given that the material scope 
of Article 26 of the ICCPR is broader.  
3.2 Interpreting the right to non-discrimination 
The ICCPR does not contain a definition of discrimination or an exposition of what 
constitutes discrimination. However, in General Comment No. 18 (1989) the Human 
Rights Committee (HRC) provides an explanation of the term, deduced from the definition 
of discrimination stipulated in the ICERD, which considers discrimination to signify 
“distinction, exclusion, restriction of preference”, based on any ground, “and which has 
the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by 
all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.”82  
 
However, the right to non-discrimination does not entail that every differentiation of 
treatment constitutes a violation of the norm. The ECtHR in particular has contributed to 
the understanding of the distinction between legitimate differential treatment and wrongful 
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discrimination, where the elaboration in the Belgian Linguistic Case (1968) is still 
considered instrumental. In this judgment, the Court stated that:  
 
“The principle of equality of treatment is violated if the distinction has no objective and 
reasonable justification. The existence of such a justification must be assessed in relation 
to the aim and effects of the measure under consideration, regard being had to the 
principles which normally prevail in democratic societies. A difference of treatment in the 
exercise of a right laid down in the Convention must not only pursue a legitimate aim: 
Article 14 is likewise violated when it is clearly established that there is no reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be 
realised.”83  
 
While there are variations in the formulations of the tests that must be established, one can 
arguably infer from the above excerpt the following criteria to be applicable for the 
determination of whether differential treatment is permissible: Firstly, one must establish 
the existence of differential treatment; secondly, whether there is an objective and 
reasonable justification for the differentiation; and lastly, assessing whether the differential 
treatment is proportional to the legitimate aim of differentiation.
84
   
3.2.1 Establishing differential treatment 
In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, one must show that there has 
been a differentiation in treatment. This necessitates that the requirement of comparability 
is satisfied. The comparator requirement entails that the applicant must establish that in 
comparison to an individual or a group in a similar situation, he or she has suffered from 
disadvantageous treatment as a consequence of belonging, or being perceived to belong, to 
a protected group. The prohibition on discrimination may also be engaged in cases where 
persons in specifically different situations are treated equally.
85
 The ECtHR usually require 
the applicant to satisfy the comparability test by establishing an “analogous” situation, 
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however, there are cases where the test is applied as part of the reasonable and objective 
justification assessment, thereby changing the burden of proof onto the respondent State.
86
  
3.2.2 Objective and reasonable justification  
If a difference in treatment is found to be a prima facie violation of the right to non-
discrimination, it might nonetheless be deemed compatible with the stipulated provisions, 
provided that the differentiation has an objective and reasonable justification. In practice 
this entails that the purpose of the difference in treatment must serve a legitimate aim and 
that the means employed must be proportionate to the aim sought.  
 
In statements issued by UN treaty bodies it is accentuated that the difference in treatment 
must be compatible with the aim and purpose of the human rights instrument. This 
qualifying aspect is arguably important, as the assessment of what is deemed reasonable 
may be highly subjective. While the criterion of objectivity may suffer from the same 
subjective disposition, the recognition of the immaterial role of discriminatory intent makes 
the objectivity test more easily satisfied.  
 
As confirmed in chapter 2, it is normally unproblematic for the responding State to prove 
that the difference in treatment pursues a legitimate aim, such as national security, as the 
assessment typically concentrates on the aim itself, without considering the underlying 
rationale of the aim, its efficacy or the consequences it might generate. This has led 
commentators to argue that the legitimate aims test is “completely toothless in combating 
discrimination”.87 Adhering to the principle of subsidiarity, the ECtHR rarely engages 
notably with these issues, which accordingly elucidates that the primary issue of concern 
for the Court when assessing the legitimate aims test is to confirm that the difference in 
treatment was not a result of discriminatory intent.
88
 It could thus be argued that the 
legitimate aim test is fairly redundant.  
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The second criterion of the objective and reasonable justification test involves the 
proportionality assessment over the differentiation in question and the legitimate aim 
sought realised. As declared in the Belgian Linguistics case, Article 14 will be violated if 
there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the 
aim sought to be realised. Judgments from the ECtHR on Article 14 demonstrate that the 
proportionality analysis as part of the test to determine whether differential treatment has 
been permissible is in conformity with the general principle of proportionality employed in 
relation to substantive Convention rights. As a result, the Court will necessarily assess the 
applicable criteria in relation to the fair balance doctrine, and furthermore, allow the State 
with a certain margin of appreciation. As will be elaborated upon below, States are 
normally granted a more restricted margin in cases that concerns differential treatment on 
basis of ethnicity or religion. However, the extent to which the Court actually considers 
questions over whether there is a suitable balance between the means employed and the 
aim sought in relation to the proportionality assessment in the objective and reasonable 
justification stage varies.
89
 
3.2.3 Protected grounds and State discretion  
When claims of discrimination are brought before a judicial body, the standard of review 
will be contingent on several factors. Most importantly, the ground upon which the 
difference in treatment is based will impact the discretion afforded to the State, 
furthermore, affect the perceived legitimacy of the justifications for the differentiation. The 
ECtHR has stated that the margin of appreciation afforded to States in cases concerning a 
difference in treatment will differ according to “the circumstances, the subject matter and 
its background.”90 Importantly, the standard of review will be influenced by the protected 
ground invoked, especially in relation to so-called “suspect” grounds, denoting potentially 
prejudicial characterizations of groups that historically have been at a disadvantageous 
position in society, thus necessitating particularly strong justifications on behalf of the 
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State.
91
 While the ECtHR does not operate with the term “suspect grounds” as such, the 
Court will require “very weighty reasons” in order to justify differentiations based on such 
distinctions.
92
 
 
Provisions on non-discriminations contain an attached enumeration of grounds of 
discrimination that are prohibited. Article 26 of the ICCPR and Article 14 of the ECHR 
comprise an illustrative catalogue of prohibited categories of discrimination, as the listing 
in both instrument are prefaced by the wording “any ground such as”, and furthermore, 
includes the category “other status”. Article (1) of the ICERD, however, stipulates a closed 
enumeration of protected grounds, limited to the thematic scope of the instrument.  
 
The HRC has employed the classification of “other status” to encompass several 
alternative bases for differential treatment.
93
 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) has taken the position that there shall be no hierarchy of 
discriminatory grounds,
94
 whereas the HRC, by contrast, has given priority to the 
enumerated distinctions stipulated in Article 26, especially in relation to suspect grounds. 
However, given the broadly defined scope of the category “other status”, commentators 
argue that the practice of the HRC suggests that the treaty body does not necessarily 
consider the grounds for discrimination as an imperative variable in an assessment over a 
claim of discriminatory treatment.
95
 Notwithstanding the foregoing, it should be noted that 
the HRC has been reluctant to consider claims of indirect discrimination unless the rule in 
question has had a negative effect of a group explicitly enumerated in Article 26.
96
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When determining whether an individual could be distinguished as member of one of the 
protected grounds, self-identification by the respective individual is sufficient, unless no 
justification exists to the contrary. Perceived or associated membership with a group is 
further included.
 97
 Differential treatment on basis of the protected grounds of ethnicity and 
religion should arguably be considered to be most relevant for individuals designated with 
risky identities and thus selected for pre-emptive surveillance measures.  
 
Ethnic origin is considered to possess the status of suspect ground by the UN treaty bodies 
and the ECtHR, thus necessitating considerably strong justifications for differentiation. The 
ECtHR has stated, “no difference in treatment which is based exclusively or to a decisive 
extent on a person’s ethnic origin is capable of being objectively justified in a 
contemporary society built on the principles of pluralism and respect for different 
cultures.”98 Protection of religion, however, is more ambiguous. While it is a protected 
ground under both the ICCPR and the ECHR, the ICERD does not explicitly prohibit 
discrimination on grounds of religious belief. Nevertheless, the CERD has found 
discrimination on grounds of race, ethnicity or national origin to constitute religious 
discrimination, as they exist in combination, thus invoking the concept of intersectionality 
or multiple discrimination.
99
  
 
The question over whether religion should be considered a suspect ground and thus 
resulting in a stricter review has additionally been unsettled in the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR. While recognizing it as such in the Hoffman case,
100
 it has been argued that the 
Court seemingly does not categorize religion as a suspect.
101
 However, in the recent case of 
Vojnity v. Hungary, the ECtHR stated that differentiation on basis of religion required very 
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weighty reasons, thus potentially confirming the strictness of review in cases concerning 
religious discrimination.
102
  
 
Several commentators have taken issue with the ECtHR’s arguably erratic interpretation of 
the various grounds of discrimination, that are said to suffer from an inconsistent line of 
theoretical reasoning.
103
 According to this view, the Court has adopted two diverging lines 
of interpretation in relation to the type of differential treatment that would engage Article 
14. One approach has been an arguably textual interpretation of the provision and the non-
exhaustive list of grounds, thereby rendering nearly any form of differential treatment 
within the ambit of a Convention right admissible, regardless of a consideration of which 
discriminatory ground the differentiation in question would pertain to.
104
  
 
By contrast, the differing approach, which seemingly has acquired a more prominent role in 
recent jurisprudence, is the consideration of “other status” to imply that a difference in 
treatment must be based on “personal status”, indicating “an innate characteristic that 
applies from birth”,105 or alternatively, personal attributes essential to individual autonomy, 
such as religion.
106
 While critics acknowledge the Court’s recent effort to combine the two 
diverging approaches, as exemplified in the judgment of Carson (2010),
107
 they 
nonetheless perceive the Strasbourg tribunal’s application of Article 14 as inchoate, 
furthermore, that the disparate reasoning of what constitutes a discrimination ground may 
suggest an unpredictable conceptualisation of the protected grounds.
108
 The aforementioned 
considerations may, however, be ameliorated with the Court’s heightened focus on the 
social context in which the differential treatment occurs, signalling a move from primarily 
focusing on issues of formal equality towards greater recognition of substantive equality, in 
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part illustrated through considerations over indirect discrimination, which will be examined 
further below.
109
   
3.3 The concept of indirect discrimination  
The concept of indirect discrimination has evolved as an alternative framework for 
establishing impermissible differential treatment. The definition of discrimination adopted 
by UN treaty bodies accent that laws or measures may have a discriminatory purpose or 
effect, thus accentuating that discrimination may be indirect as it is effects-based. Whereas 
direct discrimination denotes unjustifiable differential treatment that occurs on basis of a 
prohibited ground, indirect discrimination materializes when an apparently neutral measure 
has an adverse and disproportionate effect on a particular group, in the absence of an 
objective and reasonable justification.
110
 As noted by Schiek, while the recognition of 
direct discrimination may involve considerations over social reality, the former prohibition 
is primarily concerned with ensuring formal – or de jure – equality between individuals, 
whereas indirect discrimination thus concentrates on the effects or consequences of certain 
laws or measures.
111
  
 
The concept of indirect discrimination is underdeveloped in the case law of the ECtHR as 
the Court has been, and arguably continues to be, reluctant to employ it. However, the 
concept has been applied in recent judgments, particularly relying on case law from the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ), signalling an extension in the protective scope of Article 
14.
112
 The ECtHR has ruled that impermissible differential treatment may occur not only 
from legislative measures, but also from a “de facto situation”.113 Discriminatory intent 
will thus not be required for establishing a possible case of discrimination. Nevertheless, as 
evidenced in the landmark decision on indirect racial discrimination of D.H. and Others v. 
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Czech Republic, the Court places a strict burden upon the applicant to demonstrate that 
indirect discrimination has taken place, as the disadvantageous treatment must be 
substantiated by statistical evidence.
114
 In the aforementioned case, the Court ruled; 
“statistics which appear on critical examination to be reliable and significant will be 
sufficient to constitute the prima facie evidence the applicant is required to produce”.115  
However, in cases concerning allegations of religious or ethnic discrimination, it can be 
particularly challenging for the applicant to provide sufficient evidence of differential 
treatment, which clearly will be further exacerbated in situations where differential 
treatment have occurred covertly, as with pre-emptive surveillance. Nevertheless, the 
ECtHR has stated that if the incident at issue lies within the exclusive knowledge of the 
State, the burden of proof may shift.
116
   
 
Should the indirect discrimination be prima facie established, the assessment of objective 
justification will be reviewed. One can arguably assume that in cases concerning claims of 
indirect discrimination on basis of suspect grounds such as ethnicity or religion, the Court 
will provide the State with little leniency when assessing the justification for the 
differential treatment. However, one may nevertheless question whether the pursuit of 
certain national security objectives as the legitimate aim for differentiation will lead to a 
deferential stance by the Court, thus diluting the concept and the scope of successfully 
proving discrimination.  
 
It thus follows, that from a normative point of view, the concept of indirect discrimination 
may be considered as a suitable framework for assessing the implications of applying pre-
emptive surveillance towards particular groups encompassing risky identities, on basis of 
their common religious beliefs or ethnic origin. Furthermore, the concept’s focus on group 
rather than individual equality; arguably makes it particularly apposite for examining the 
disproportionate harm that may be inflicted by a neutral measure, such as the rules 
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governing the application of pre-emptive surveillance measures. However, in regard to the 
judicial application of the concept, one can arguably identify several potential limitations 
that can render the concept unfit for establishing impermissible disadvantageous treatment. 
It could be argued that a notable limitation to the concept is the fact that in addition to 
having to provide sufficient statistical evidence, it has to be established that the 
disadvantageous treatment emanates from a suspect ground. This might be specifically 
challenging to demonstrate in cases concerning national security where the discretion of the 
State is significant, thus rendering the objective justification more easily established.  
3.4 Conclusive remarks 
This chapter has sought to establish that permissible restrictions on the right to non-
discrimination, on basis of the protected grounds of ethnicity or religion, necessitate 
particularly strong justifications from the State. However, this test may be more easily 
satisfied when in pursuit of national security objectives. The analysis has further 
accentuated that the concept of indirect discrimination could be considered an apposite 
framework for examining the potential effects that pre-emptive counterterrorism 
surveillance measures may have on particular groups of individuals considered to inhabit 
risky identities, as its protective scope extends to the situation on the ground.  
 
Recognizing the vital importance of the principle of proportionality in assessments over 
whether differential treatment has an objective and reasonable justification, it thus follows 
that a central issue for examination in the following analysis is whether the pre-emptive 
surveillance measures employed for counterterrorism purposes, and the differences in 
treatment they entail, should be considered as suitable and effective. Furthermore, chapter 5 
will examine whether such differentiation may be considered to satisfy the criterion that the 
measures shall not impose an excessive disadvantage to the people involved in relation to 
the aim sought. Central to this discussion is the aforementioned concept of indirect 
discrimination and the examination of whether neutral pre-emptive surveillance measures 
involve disadvantageous treatment of particular groups in society.   
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4 Pre-emptive counterterrorism surveillance  
The following chapter will examine how the paradigm of prevention’s objective of 
predicting future threats to national security has led to an intensified focus on an 
individual’s personal characteristics, arguing that religion and ethnicity has come to 
constitute proxies for risk. It will further assess the legal framework pertaining to the pre-
emptive surveillance measures employed by the Police Security Service and examine 
whether predictive profiling based on religion and ethnicity should be considered an 
effective counterterrorism strategy.  
4.1 The paradigm of prevention’s categorization of risky identities  
Several scholars of criminal law are pointing out that we are currently undergoing a 
paradigmatic shift from a post- to a pre-crime society. The former employs a retrospective 
focus where prosecution and punishment of committed crimes are at the central, while in 
the prospective focus of the latter, these objectives are replaced by an all-encompassing 
aim of identifying potential suspects and preventing future crime.
117
 In part, the preventive 
focus enables an expansion in the pre-emptive powers of the police, both in terms of the 
measures that might be employed and on what grounds of suspicion. As noted in chapter 1, 
the proactive disposition of the law arguably serves as an important indication of this 
paradigmatic shift.    
 
The paradigm of prevention is premised on the idea that anticipatory action is essential for 
effectively managing potential risks.
118
 Consequently, an imperative aspect of pre-emptive 
politics is the precautionary principle. Originally adopted in the field of environmental law, 
the principle demands the recognition that with a heightened level of threats against 
national security, not knowing specifically what the enemy looks like or how the threat will 
materialize is nonetheless no excuse for inaction.
119
 The focus on prevention is thus not 
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employed solely because it is deemed appropriate, but because it is considered highly 
necessary.
120
  
 
This preventive focus arguably contributes to a tendency where the fear of pursuing false 
positives is substituted by the fear of not identifying the false negatives.
121
 This logic 
arguably inverts the rationale epitomised in the traditional principle that it is better to have 
ten criminals go free than to have a single innocent individual punished. It could further be 
argued that this is premised on the securitized line of reasoning conveying that providing a 
potential suspect with the benefit of the doubt may result in risking the lives of innocent 
individuals.
122
 Furthermore, in opposition to having the State prove a person’s guilt, the 
alleged suspects are increasingly expected to prove their innocence and ensure their 
continuous benign behaviour.
123
 As evident with the criminalization of preparatory acts of 
terrorism, a person suspected of potentially being a future perpetrator will as a result be 
presumed guilty of the uncommitted crime, in order to protect the potential victims against 
irreparable harm.  
 
Against this background, it is imperative to examine how the lack of a specifically 
identified threat, alongside the prevalence of the precautionary principle, leads to the 
categorization of individuals on basis of prevalent threat assessments. Given the limited 
resources of the Police Security Service, it will necessarily have to be selective when 
deciding who is considered necessary to collect and treat information about. A central 
question for inquiry is thus whether the pre-emptive strategy applied by the Police Security 
Service is based on a prediction of threats that uses ethnicity and religion as proxies for risk 
in order to identify possible perpetrators, thereby assigning individuals with a particular 
ethnic origin or religious belief with risky identities. The following section will examine 
the legal framework that regulates the use of pre-emptive surveillance measures by the 
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Police Security Service and assess how the aforementioned questions are manifested in the 
information gathering of the Service.  
4.2 Legal framework on preventive surveillance in Norway  
4.2.1 The scope of application of pre-emptive surveillance powers  
The rules pertaining to the information gathering of the Police Security Service is regulated 
on basis of the purpose of the collection, distinguishing between preventive and 
investigative purposes. Whereas the distinction between preventive and investigative 
purposes are clearer in relation to other branches of the police authorities in Norway, most 
of the work of the Police Security Service can be designated as preventive, even when it 
concerns investigations.
124
  
 
The tasks and responsibilities of the Police Security Service are stipulated in Chapter IIIa, 
Section 17b and c of the Police Act.
125
 Section 17b paragraph 5 of the Police Act states that 
the Police Security Service shall prevent and investigate sabotage and politically motivated 
violence or coercion, or violations of Sections 147a, 147b and 147c of the General Civil 
Penal Code, which are the provisions pertaining to acts of terrorism and terrorism-related 
offenses.
126
 It is the Service’s preventive tasks that are most crucial for countering national 
security threats. The Police Security Service is the only agency of the Police authorized to 
collect and treat information about persons for preventive purposes, by placing individuals 
that have not committed any criminal act under surveillance.
127
  
 
This entails that in a preliminary mapping phase, the Police Security Service has broad 
authority to conduct information gathering for preventive purposes without satisfying any 
other criterion than that it has to be considered relevant for its tasks, pursuant to Section 
17b of the Police Act. In practice, when the Police Security Service collects information for 
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preventive purposes, it will subsequently undergo an assessment over whether the 
information should be stored; recorded in their working register;
128
 as material constituting 
the basis for initiating a preventive case; or for an investigative case.
129
  
 
The Police Security Service has a range of different methods at their disposal for pre-
emptive information gathering. The methods continuum include those measures that are not 
written in law such as the use of open sources or by means of covert coercive measures that 
requires a judicial order. For preventive purposes, covert coercive measures can be 
authorized if the Police Security Service considers there to be “reasons to examine” 
whether someone is preparing a criminal offense that the Service is mandated to prevent.
130
 
If the Police Security Service initiates an investigative case, employment of covert coercive 
measures can be authorized if satisfying the threshold “reasonable grounds to believe”, as 
stipulated in the Criminal Procedures Act.
131
 Certain covert coercive measures such as the 
use of audio surveillance may only be used in investigative cases, as it is deemed to be an 
overly intrusive measure employed for preventive purposes. The use of covert coercive 
measures shall only be applied in cases where other methods of collecting information are 
deemed insufficient and when such surveillance is considered to provide information of 
major importance for the case.
132
  
 
In 2009 the Methods Evaluation Committee considered the extent to which the Police 
Secret Service employs covert coercive measures for preventive purposes as modest.
133
 
However, the EOS Committee
134
 has over the last years in their unclassified annual reports 
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emphasized that there has been an increase in their application for preventive purposes.
135
 
This tendency has led commentators to question whether the Police Security Service’s 
utilization of covert coercive measures is incompatible with the requirement that such 
measures should primarily be applied for investigative purposes and that the Service 
accordingly interprets the stipulated conditions too broadly.
136
   
4.2.2 Legal limitations on the treatment of collected information  
The following section will examine the rules pertaining to the treatment of collected 
information by the Police Security Service, furthermore, how the applicable criteria relates 
to information gathering on basis of a person’s religious belief and ethnicity. A special 
report
137
 issued to the Parliament by the EOS Committee in 2013 (hereinafter, 2013 special 
report) on the surveillance of two Muslim communities in Norway over a time period of ten 
years, will constitute the analytical parameter for the ensuing discussion, as the report 
arguably provides valuable and rare empirical insight into the pre-emptive surveillance 
practices of the Police Security Service. Furthermore, the findings in the report is 
considered imperative for substantiating the thesis’ hypothesis that pre-emptive 
counterterrorism surveillance is premised on a prediction of future national security threats 
that uses ethnicity and religion as proxies for risk.  
 
The treatment of information collected by the Police Security Service is subject to three 
cumulative criteria. It must have a defined purpose; be necessary; and be of certain quality. 
Assessments pertaining to the criteria will be contingent on the situation at hand, for 
instance affected by the scope and intrusiveness of the method employed for collecting 
information. The conditions reflect the need to ensure predictability and supervision, as 
elaborated upon in the Police Registry Regulation.
138
 Furthermore, paragraph 21-3 of the 
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Police Registry Regulation lists permitted characteristics upon which information may be 
recorded and treated, excluding religious or ethnicity unless strictly necessary.
139
   
4.2.2.1 The criterion of defined purpose  
The purpose for the treatment of information is, as stipulated in the Police Registry 
Regulation paragraph 20-2, to realize the responsibilities and tasks of the Police Security 
Service. The Service can only treat information in accordance with the purpose upon which 
it has been collected; furthermore, the purpose underpinning the collected information shall 
always be specified, both outside of and in preventive cases.
140
 It thus follows, that the 
specified purpose for the collected information will be instrumental for determining the 
criteria of necessity and relevance.  
 
As noted in the 2013 special report, central to the Police Security Service’s work on 
counterterrorism is to monitor persons or communities in Norway that has the potential to 
impair the State’s national security through violent means.141 Pursuant to the aim of 
protecting national security, the Service is afforded broad discretionary judgment to 
determine who are considered imperative to collect information about. However, the 
purpose for the collected information must be correlated to an assumption about a person or 
community’s acceptance of using violence as a measure for realizing its aims. It thus 
follows that the religious, political or ideological convictions of an object placed under 
surveillance should be considered immaterial, unless coupled with a violent intent.   
4.2.2.2 The criterion of necessity  
The criterion of necessity is closely connected to the defined purpose. The Police Security 
Service can only treat information that is necessary for the purposes listed in the Police 
Registry Regulation paragraph 20-2. Additionally, paragraph 21-1 stipulates that in 
preventive cases the information used must have an objective connection to the respective 
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case, whereas general registrations shall be treated on a basis of necessity for the work of 
the Police Security Service.
142
 In the travaux préparatoires to the Police Registry Act, it is 
stated that the necessity requirement should be interpreted to include two criteria of 
probability and objective justification. Firstly, there must be a certain level of probability 
for the preparation or planning of a criminal act. The probability assessment must be based 
on certain objective indications and it should in principle be required that the act sought 
prevented is not a remote possibility. This requirement is, however, subject to modification 
on basis of a proportionality assessment of the measures employed. Secondly, the use of 
information for preventive purposes must have an objective justification.
143
 In relation to 
the treatment of information outside of a preventive case, the necessity criterion requires 
considerations over the information’s relevance for the purpose sought and prevailing 
threat assessments.
144
 
 
The necessity requirement arguably raises imperative questions about what sort of 
information it is considered necessary to collect material about. In the 2013 special report, 
the EOS Committee notes that the initial premise is that it should not be considered 
necessary to collect information about a person simply because he or she is of a certain 
ethnic origin or has a particular religious belief.
145
 Up until 2014, the directive regulating 
the Police Security Service included a provision that prohibited treatment of information 
solely on basis of an individual’s ethnicity or religious conviction.146 However, with the 
enactment of the Police Registry Act, this prohibition was repealed. The Police Security 
Service is now authorized to record information on the aforementioned grounds, provided 
that it is strictly necessary in relation to the purpose of the treatment.
147
 The Police Registry 
Regulation explicates that such treatment may be deemed necessary in situations where the 
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information is considered to be of vital importance to why or how a particular criminal act 
is expected to be committed or when the purpose of the treatment cannot be achieved 
without it.
148
  
 
The travaux préparatoires to the Police Registry Act presupposes that such information 
will never constitute the basis for treatment.
149
 However, the 2013 special report shows that 
the Police Security Service registered information about a number of individuals solely on 
basis of being their religion,
150
 furthermore, that information about individuals’ religious 
beliefs had in numerous instances been collected and treated in a manner that did not 
satisfy the necessity criterion, as it could not be sufficiently established that the treatment 
of the collected information contributed to the purpose of the surveillance.
151
 Additionally, 
the EOS Committee states that in several instances it could not be established that the 
registrations on religious beliefs had contributed to determining the respective individuals’ 
potential or probability of using violence.
152
  
4.2.2.3 The criterion of quality  
The criterion of quality includes four sub-tests that aim to ensure the adequacy, relevance, 
correctness and updated nature of the information collected.
153
. The information must have 
a close connection to the purpose of the collected information; furthermore, if the 
information can be obtained by treating fewer and less sensitive details, this procedure shall 
be used.
154
 Most importantly for the present discussion is arguably the criterion of 
relevance. When should information about a person’s ethnicity or religious beliefs be 
considered relevant for pre-emptive surveillance purposes?  
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If it can be established with concrete and reliable evidence that an individual or community 
advocates or has the potential for religiously motivated violence, it would indeed be 
justified for the Police Security Service to place such individuals or communities under 
surveillance. However, when evaluating whether individuals that are associated with such 
persons or groups should be monitored, it arguably raises imperative questions about how 
peripheral such associations can be, particularly if the consideration of suspicion is founded 
on basis of personal characteristics such as ethnic origin or religious belief.    
 
The EOS Committee states that in situations where the potential for violence is uncertain or 
unresolved, surveillance must be limited, as any random association with the particular 
community cannot be considered relevant for the purpose.
155
 However, the 2013 special 
report shows that despite the aforementioned restrictions, the Police Security Service has 
treated information about, for instance, the two Muslim communities’ religious leaders, 
their positions, their money transfers and religious education lessons, which included 
information about individuals considered too peripheral, thus leading to the conclusion that 
it could not be sufficiently established that the treatment of information was necessary nor 
relevant. In relation to one of the two Muslim communities, the Police Security Service 
even communicated to the EOS Committee that the surveillance had conceivably been 
conducted for an excessive time period.
156
  
 
While such hindsight could be seen to suggest that the Police Security Service expectantly 
will correct its errors in future cases, the violations of the applicable rules should arguably 
give raise to great concern, particularly since the practices to a considerable extent has 
violated the requirement that information about a person’s religious belief should only be 
collected if considered strictly necessary. If this provision is disregarded, the strict 
necessity-requirement will arguably be void of any protective scope. The 2013 special 
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report clearly demonstrates that the Police Security Service has failed to adhere to this 
injunction.   
 
Lastly, it is important to note that while the three conditions of purpose, necessity and 
relevance regulates the treatment of information for preventive purposes, the Police 
Registry Act enables the Police Security Service to store information for preventive 
purposes in four months without subjecting the information to the above conditions, in 
order to assess whether the information meets these criteria.
157
 The information collected 
shall be evaluated against the three criteria as soon as possible. However, if the information 
is collected on basis of suspicion raised by the ethnic origin or religious beliefs of certain 
individuals, thus potentially generating a large pool of false positives, one might question 
whether such storage of data can be justified. The malpractice evidenced above arguably 
constitutes a considerable impediment to the privacy rights of the individuals concerned 
and may, as will be examined in chapter 5, constitute instances of indirect discrimination.  
4.3 Identifying risk on basis of religion or ethnicity – an effective strategy? 
The term “enemy images” has been adopted by Mathiesen as a description of how the 
State’s surveillance practices are geared towards specific threats to national security.158 
Following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, Islamic terrorism has increasingly 
been encompassed into this enemy image and manifested as the predominant terrorism 
threat in the contemporary security realm.
159
 In Norway, the Police Security Service has 
maintained that extreme Islamism constitutes the greatest threat to national security. This 
reality was upheld following the terrorist attacks on 22 July 2011, which was committed by 
far-right extremist Anders Behring Breivik, and has been reiterated in the Service’s annual 
unclassified threat assessments.
160
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Accordingly, one can safely assume that the dominant focus of the Police Secret Service is 
towards persons that may be associated with this particular threat. While such 
systematization of strategic knowledge is a necessary and appropriate way of working to 
effectively counter potential threats, it nonetheless raises the question of whether it leads to 
a threat categorization that, when applied, fuses predictive identifications of potential 
terrorists with other innocent individuals, as they have common characteristics such as 
religion or ethnicity. While the classified nature of factual threat predictions makes it is 
empirically unfeasible to effectively verify or falsify this claim, it is arguably necessary to 
examine whether the particular focus on extreme Islamism in Norway corresponds with a 
broader assessment of terrorism threats internationally.  
 
As pointed out by Mathiesen, examination of the Europol’s EU Terrorism Situation and 
Trend Report (TE-SAT) over the last years show that a notable minority of the 
unsuccessful, prevented and successful terrorist attacks in EU States were carried out by 
Islamist groups.
161
 The latest issued report covering 2013 confirms this trend, by stating “as 
in previous years, the majority of attacks can be attributed to separatist terrorism” 
denoting left-wing and anarchist terrorism, furthermore, “EU Member States did not report 
any terrorist attacks specifically classified as (…) religiously inspired terrorism for the 
period of 2013”.162 The report does recognize that religious extremism “appears to be 
evident”163 and that there has been an increase in arrests for recruitment and travelling for 
terrorist purposes to conflict zones, particularly emphasizing the protracted conflict in 
Syria.
164
 
 
While the illustration above is not intended to unreservedly question the actual threat faced 
by Islamic terrorism to the national security of Norway, one might nonetheless use the 
outlined tendency to inquire whether the focus on an individual’s religious belief and 
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affiliation with Islam constituting influential variables for identifying potential targets for 
pre-emptive surveillance should be considered suitable. Any assessment of the 
proportionality of an interference with an individual’s privacy and right not to be unjustly 
discriminated against on basis of suspect grounds such as religion necessitates, in part, that 
the interference is effective in realizing the aim sought. This entails that the manner in 
which the Police Security Service adopts pre-emptive information gathering must be 
considered to effectively satisfy the purpose of the surveillance. Should information be 
gathered about individuals that are deemed worrisome or suspicious, in which their 
religious affiliation constitutes an important variable for identifying them as such, it has to 
be established that this will in fact effectively contribute to the defined purpose. There is, 
however, considerable evidence to suggest that predictive risk profiling on basis of a 
person’s ethnicity or religious belief should be considered ineffective for preventive 
purposes.  
4.4 The use of predictive terrorist profiling  
Predictive profiling has become a much-used and much-debated law enforcement method 
of the counterterrorism paradigm.
165
 Profiling can be descriptive, used to identify particular 
persons likely to have committed a criminal act based on explanatory variables and forensic 
evidence, or it may be predictive, signalling that it is developed so as to identify terrorists 
behind crimes that have not yet been committed.
166
 A profile will thus encompass a range 
of various factors that constitute generalizations about certain groups of people. Should one 
of these constituting factors be race, religion or ethnicity; racial or ethnic profiling takes 
place. While the use of such characteristics certainly may be legitimate and appropriate for 
descriptive profiling, it is arguably much more problematic when applied for predictive 
purposes, especially when applied in the absence of concrete circumstantial intelligence. 
The Police Security Service is, as illustrated above, prevented from exclusively collecting 
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information about a person’s ethnicity or religious belief unless it is considered strictly 
necessary, 
167
 As established above, there are however, reasons to question the compliance 
with this rule. One of the fundamental deficiencies with the use of predictive profiling is 
arguably that it creates predictions that are not based on verified facts and statistical data, 
but rather on unreliable and inaccurate assumptions about certain groups deemed to be of 
particular risk. Furthermore, such generalisations will necessarily create a high rate of false 
positives.  
 
It has been argued that the use of predictive profiling for counterterror purposes is in part 
an effective way of identifying so-called terrorist “sleepers”, denoting individuals who “do 
not fit any specific behavioural or psychological pattern, whose very existence is only 
assumed”.168 Consequently, given that “sleepers” typically are hard to identify on basis of 
their behaviour, personal characteristics become vital. Moeckli demonstrates how the 
controversial Rasterfahndung programme was applied in Germany following the 11 
September 2001 events; a method entailing the screening of vast amounts of personal 
statistical data to identify potential terrorists on basis of predictive profiling. A unified 
profile was adopted consisting of the following factors: “Male; age 18-40; current or 
former student; Muslim denomination; born in, or national of, one of several specified 
countries with a predominantly Muslim population.”169 Data from approximately 8 million 
people were processed, of which 32 000 matched the above criteria. It did not result in 
exposing any sleepers, or in any prosecution of terrorism-related offenses, thus arguably 
serving as indications of the ineffectiveness of predictive profiling.
170
 The Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany declared the programme unconstitutional in 2006, stating 
that preventive data screening violated the fundamental right of informational self-
determination.
171
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The above example arguably accentuates the fallacy of employing predictive profiles for 
counterterrorism purposes, furthermore, demonstrating the increased relevance of 
individual characteristics in the effort to identify potential terrorists.
172
 Martin Scheinin, 
UN Special Rapporteur on counterterrorism and human rights, has asserted that evidence 
suggests that profiling based on ethnicity or religion are unsuitable and ineffective for 
countering terrorism, furthermore, warning about the «profound emotional toll» it can have 
on the large amount of innocent individuals that are subjected to it.
173
 Against this 
background, it could be argued that the use of predictive profiling, as exemplified by using 
ethnicity and religion as proxies for risk, should raise notable concerns over whether it 
would be considered suitable and effective means in a proportionality assessment over the 
differential treatment generated by pre-emptive surveillance measures.   
4.5 Conclusive remarks  
This chapter has outlined the emergence of the paradigm of prevention and sought to 
demonstrate how its objective of identifying and preventing future crime has led to a 
categorization of individuals seen to inhabit risky identities, where a person’s ethnic origin 
or religious beliefs constitute proxies for risk. The information inferred from the EOS 
Committee’s special report to the parliament arguably serves as empirical evidence to 
substantiate the thesis’ hypothesis.  The suitability and effectiveness of using predictive 
terrorist profiling has been rebutted, thus accentuating that such identification should be 
considered to constitute a notable challenge to the protection afforded by the right to non-
discrimination.  
 
The following chapter will examine how the categorization of risky identities on basis of 
religion and ethnicity has the capacity to generate suspect communities. It will examine 
whether the disproportional effects that pre-emptive surveillance measures may have on 
such groups of risky identities, which share common characteristics such as religion or 
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ethnicity, could be seen to constitute instances of indirect discrimination. Lastly, it will 
assess whether the creation of suspect communities can foster counterproductive effects 
that restrain the State in the implementation of its counterterrorism objectives.  
 53 
5 The creation of suspect communities  
The preceding analysis has accentuated that an imperative aspect of the employment of pre-
emptive surveillance measures for counterterrorism purposes is the identification of 
religion and ethnicity as proxies for risk in order to identify potential perpetrators. This 
invites the question of whether particular sub-groups in society that share such religious 
beliefs or ethnic origin are more easily categorized as a group deemed to be more 
suspicious than others. If so, is it accurate to describe them as constituting a suspect 
community? Furthermore, what could the potential harms inflicted by such categorization 
be and should the disproportionate effects that pre-emptive surveillance measures may have 
on these groups be considered as forms of indirect discrimination?  
5.1 The suspect community thesis  
Experiences in the United Kingdom on the application of counterterrorism legislation and 
the far-reaching police powers these laws have permitted,
174
 has led to a debate over 
whether it is correct to identify British Muslims as constituting a “suspect community”.175 
Breen-Smyth argues that the contemporary initiation of viewing Muslims as part of a 
«global suspect community» came in the wake of 11 September 2001 and the Bush 
administration’s allegation of the «axis of evil».176 As additional proponents of this view, 
Pantazis and Pemberton define a suspect community to signify a “sub-group of the 
population that is singled out for state attention as being ‘problematic’”.177 Those arguing 
in favour of the suspect community thesis contend that counterterrorism legislation has 
been applied in a discriminatory manner, leaving Muslims disproportionately encumbered 
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by the implemented measures, notwithstanding the fact that politicians have been eager to 
accent extreme Islamists as distinctly separated from the majority Muslim population.
178
  
 
Contrary to this view, others have dismissed the entire thesis as misplaced, as there is no 
empirical evidence to suggest that the enacted counterterrorism law has placed all – nor a 
majority – of Muslims in the United Kingdom under official State suspicion. Greer argues 
that it is erroneous to regard British Muslims as a suspect community, primarily on basis of 
the claim that Muslims are not a monolithic group and can thus not be designated as a 
“community”. 179  Furthermore, he notes “there can be no question that the current terrorist 
threat is Islamist by nature rather than merely an result of official labelling”.180 
 
One might arguably infer from the comprehensive research carried out on the 
discriminatory effects of the stop and search measures employed in the United Kingdom 
that the police authorities worked on particular assumptions about the physical appearance 
of potential terrorist threats.
181
 However, if a group of people were pre-selected as 
strategically more relevant for observation and information gathering, on basis of 
characteristics shared by a large amount of people, this would presumably entail that a 
great share of the pre-selected group was placed under surveillance without actually 
constituting a threat, but by fitting a particular threat pattern. This aspect is often 
highlighted as an unfortunate, but inevitable aspect of counterterrorism surveillance, 
namely that in the search for terrorists, innocent people may be affected.  
 
However, while individuals do not enjoy protection against suspicion by the State, one 
could nonetheless question the broader implications such identification has on certain sub-
groups of society. If the suspicion is systematized and applied accordingly towards 
particular groups on basis of their risky identities, one could call into question whether such 
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practices would be deemed legitimate given that a sub-group of society is 
disproportionately encumbered by such a policy.  
 
Greer asserts that in the Ireland v. United Kingdom case, the ECtHR ruled that if a threat to 
the national security of the State originates from a specified minority, disproportionate 
effects on this group do not necessarily mean that it would constitute a violation of the right 
to non-discrimination.
182
 Against this background, he argues that under the current situation 
of confronting Islamic terrorism, some Muslims will inevitably fall under official 
suspicion. However, he invalidates the claim that all Muslims in the United Kingdom have 
been placed under official suspicion, as being subject to stigmatization or Islamophobia 
cannot be considered as equivalent to being a formal suspect. Furthermore, Greer notes that 
such practice nonetheless would be objectionable from a human rights perspective only “if 
it is groundless and leads to adverse consequences for those concerned or if it leads to 
consequences that cannot be defended by reference to whatever grounds they are.”183   
5.1.1 Indications of harm inflicted by membership in suspect communities  
If accepting Greer’s argument outlined above, one would nevertheless have to assess 
whether there are in fact adverse consequences generated for those individuals or specific 
groups that are placed under suspicion by the State, and the ensuing harm inflicted by being 
designated as a member of suspect communities. This could obviously only be done on a 
case-by-case basis. However, research has been conducted on the general impact the overt 
counterterrorism measures applied in the United Kingdom has had on Muslim 
communities, which suggests that the adverse consequences referred to by Greer has in fact 
materialized.  
 
While noting the varied experience among the participants, research conducted by 
Choudhury and Fenwick on the impact of counterterrorism measures on Muslim 
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communities show that counterterrorism law and policies are experienced “more intensely, 
acutely and directly” by Muslims, in comparison to the non-Muslims interviewed, 
moreover, that the experiences imply that the two groups live “parallel lives”.184 
Furthermore, the researchers contend that there was a “damaging disconnect between the 
state and communities in their conceptions of ‘threat’”, leading them to assert that British 
Muslims’ experiences of counterterrorism laws contribute to the feeling of being part of a 
suspect community and that “they are targeted by authorities simply because of their 
religion”.185 
 
Choudry and Fenwick’s findings are substantiated in a similar study on British Muslims’ 
encounters with counterterrorism policies, where it is accentuated that the Muslim 
respondents’ experiences led to a «state of fearfulness».186 In practice, this fear was 
manifested by for instance refraining from discussing politics at work, evading certain 
urban areas, being cautious over the topics that one could talk about on the telephone and 
Internet, or «taking care not to mention al-Qaeda or terrorism, even in jokes».
187
 
Furthermore, the discursive portrayal by politicians, law enforcement authorities and the 
media of the Muslim community as a «two-faced Janus», where law-abiding Muslims tend 
to be discussed in relation to Islamic extremists, contributed significantly to the subjective 
feeling of belonging to a suspect community.
188
 
 
While not conducted in relation to the counterterrorism context or Muslims exclusively, 
empirical research carried out in Norway on ethnic minorities’ encounters with the police, 
primarily on basis of stop and search practices, in part shows that the manner in which 
these individuals are repeatedly stopped has given them the feeling of being subjected to 
racial discrimination.
189
 Central to this perception is the absence of a definite purpose for 
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the stop by the police, which is thus seen to imply that they are selected based on 
generalizations concerning their ethnicity, physical appearance or geographical location. As 
might be expected, the lack of being provided with a specified explanation to why they are 
being stopped is seen as unreasonable. Based on the main findings of the research, Sollund 
argues that the police’s threshold for identifying certain ethnic groups as suspicious is too 
low.
190
 While asserting that this cannot be explained on basis of systemic racism in the 
police, it arguably raises important questions about the unintended consequences generated 
by police strategies that are based on notions of risky identities and particular communities 
that are identified as suspect. 
 
It should be noted that the legality of the stop and search practices under Section 44 of the 
UK Terrorism Act (2000) was adjudicated before the ECtHR in the case of Gillan & 
Quinton v. the United Kingdom in 2010. The Court ruled that there had been a violation of 
the applicants’ right to privacy, as the powers pursuant to Section 44 were not in 
accordance with the law, in view of the fact that they were not adequately circumscribed 
nor subject to adequate safeguards against abuse.
191
 However, more importantly for the 
present discussion; the Court stated that «while the present case do not concern black 
applicants or those of Asian origin, the risks of the discriminatory use of the powers 
against such persons is a very real consideration».
192
 The judgment is arguably important 
as it demonstrates how the employment of counterterrorism measures on low grounds of 
suspicion, alongside the broad discretion afforded to police authorities, has the capacity to 
affect particular groups disproportionately and in a discriminatory manner.  
5.1.2 Drawing correlations between overt and covert suspicion  
Greer has in a recent article reiterated his assertion that no empirical evidence has been 
provided to substantiate the suspect community thesis outlined above. He maintains that if 
the line of argument is to be worthy of attention, “credible evidence must be provided to 
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show that a substantial majority of […] Muslims are under some form of official 
suspicion”.193 However, while it thus appears that Greer objects the validity and 
applicability of the above research findings, his asserted position arguably elucidates an 
imperative element inherent in any deliberation over the effects of implemented 
surveillance measures; who these are directed against; and the disproportionate and 
potentially discriminatory implications they may have.  
 
Given the intrinsic confidentiality of whom pre-emptive surveillance measures are directed 
at, one will inevitably be denied the ability to effectively contradict Greer’s contention, by 
convincingly demonstrating that suspect communities have in fact been created, as groups 
of individuals designated to inhabit risky identities are singled out as suspicious by the 
Police Security Service. While not seeking to negate the obvious necessity of classified 
intelligence, nor to refute the fact that extreme Islamists constitute actual threats to the 
national security of Norway, the confidentiality underpinning the conduct of the Service 
arguably serves to prevent the recognition that pre-emptive surveillance may be applied 
disproportionately, or even unlawfully, towards particular groups on basis of their personal 
characteristics. If illegitimately applied, this should arguably be seen to constitute a 
potential menace to individuals’ ability to effectively seek a right to remedy in cases of 
wrongful application of pre-emptive surveillance measures, furthermore, towards a 
democratic and informed debate, precisely because of the citizenry’s inability to rebut the 
assumptions that the practices rely upon.     
 
While the research studies cited above have been chosen on basis of their reliability and 
scope, they are nonetheless singular empirical studies that cannot be applied with the 
conviction that they possess the whole truth about how Muslims constituting minority 
groups in Western States perceive pre-emptive counterterrorism measures. However, it 
would arguably be unwise to dismiss their utility and negate the implications they 
accentuate simply because they represent a comparatively small outlook, particularly 
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because the findings they provide and the concerns they voice are notably congruent. 
Cumulatively, they arguably serve as an important warning about the political and social 
repercussions that pre-emptive surveillance measures may have on those individuals that 
are seen to inhabit risky identities, thus forming suspect communities.  
 
It could further be argued that the empirical evidence conducted in the United Kingdom is 
pertinent for consideration in the Norwegian context, as the Police Security Service has 
used the counterterrorism measures and legislation enacted in the United Kingdom as an 
example for replication in Norway. Engene rightfully notes that this has been done without 
any coinciding considerations over the effects the implemented counterterrorism measures 
has had in the United Kingdom.
 194
 Furthermore, while pertinent objections could be raised 
to the transferable nature of the research findings cited above given that these concern overt 
procedures, the observations made should nonetheless be seen as instructive on basis of the 
following factors: If Muslims experience counterterrorism measures to cumulatively 
contribute to the perception of being categorized as a suspect community, it is arguably 
likely that this perception would be equally manifested if the measures they were being 
subjected to were covert rather than overt. It could be argued that the perception of 
suspicion would be even greater, given that the use of covert coercive measures is 
considered to represent a particularly intrusive interference into an individual’s right to 
privacy, as evidenced by the requirement that the use of such measures can only be 
authorized by a judicial order. If one were to become aware of the fact that one had been 
subjected to covert surveillance, there is arguably a high probability that a false positive 
would perceive such interference as particularly invasive if the primary reason for 
suspicion was grounded on the fact that one had a particular religious faith or ethnicity.  
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5.2 Are members of suspect communities subjected to indirect 
discrimination?  
Lack of sufficient empirical data on the surveillance practices of the Police Secret Service 
in Norway prevents the present discussion from adopting evidence-based facts as the 
analytical parameters. However, building on the aforementioned premises about the ability 
to draw correlations between overt and covert suspicion, in addition to the instances of 
unlawful information gathering of the Police Security Service noted in chapter 4, it could 
arguably be demonstrated that individuals that are considered to inhabit risky identities on 
basis of their religious beliefs or ethnic origin are disproportionately affected by pre-
emptive surveillance measures.   
 
As established in chapter 3, indirect discrimination occurs when a neutral measure, such as 
the rules pertaining to the information gathering of the Police Security Service, 
disproportionately and negatively affect members of a particular group. It thus follows that 
when applying pre-emptive surveillance measures that are not premised on an intention to 
discriminate certain individuals or communities, but the effects generated by the measures 
themselves result in disadvantageous treatment, indirect discrimination may occur. In the 
light of the current threat situation, where extreme Islamism is considered as the paramount 
danger to the national security of Norway, one can safely assume that the Police Security 
Service will direct its efforts towards individuals or groups that are considered to be 
directly or indirectly associated with this enemy image.  
 
Any consideration of factual instances of indirect discrimination could only be done on a 
case-by-case basis, necessitating a careful examination of the applicable facts. While not 
contending that all Norwegian Muslims represent one monolithic group, it could 
nevertheless be argued that it would be accurate to claim that Muslim communities in 
Norway are susceptible to being disproportionately affected by pre-emptive surveillance 
measures conducted by the Police Security Service. Where circumstantial evidence directs 
the pre-emptive surveillance of the Service and its identification of Muslim individuals as 
potential terrorists, such practices will be legitimate and in conformity with the right to 
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non-discrimination. However, if the ethnic origin or religion of an individual is the decisive 
factor for such surveillance measures, it could be argued that the objectivity underlying the 
implemented measure is highly questionable, making the test of objective justification 
increasingly harder to satisfy. Accordingly, such situations are arguably more likely to have 
the capacity to form the basis of a successful claim of indirect discrimination.  
 
The concept of indirect discrimination recognizes that certain groups of people may be 
disparately impacted by neutral measures, thus seeking to ensure substantive equality. As 
noted by the ECtHR in the judgment of Zarb Adami, recognition must be given to the 
situation on the ground.
195
 Accordingly, it is arguably vital to acknowledge the broader 
effects that pre-emptive surveillance measures can have on groups of individuals who 
perceive themselves to being disproportionately negatively affected as members of a 
suspect community. It could be argued that the probable apprehension ensuing from being 
designated as inhabiting a risky identity, has the capacity to hamper the enjoyment of other 
fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression and association as well as 
freedom of religion. The chilling effect that can be said to arise from the perception of 
being discriminated against, arguably accentuates the foundational character of the right to 
non-discrimination, as an indispensable guarantor for the fulfilment of other human rights.  
5.3 The causality between perceived discrimination and radicalization  
The respondents referred to in section 5.1.1 claiming to have been subjected to State 
suspicion on basis of their risky identities, were under the perception that they were being 
subjected to discrimination by the State. While perceived discrimination may not be 
equivalent to objective discrimination, it might nonetheless be an important factor to 
consider when assessing the overall efficiency of counterterrorism policies and the 
potential repercussions they may generate. One might further question whether such 
perceived feelings of discrimination on basis of a perceived or factual membership in a 
suspect community contribute to resentment against the State. The misidentification of 
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individuals as suspicious, on basis of their designation as possessing risky identities, may 
thus engender consequences that have long-term counterproductive effects for the Police 
Security Service.  
 
A fundamental tenet of Norway’s counterterrorism strategy is the prevention of 
radicalization.
196
 The aforementioned research conducted on the disproportional effects 
counterterrorism measures has had on Muslims in the United Kingdom, shows that police 
cooperation with minority communities are challenged, as the misrecognition by the police 
leads to processes of alienation, that further engenders unwillingness to cooperate with the 
authorities.
197
 This is arguably a problematic tendency, given that law enforcement 
authorities will be dependent on good community relations in order to effectively respond 
to terrorism threats, particularly in relation to the work on countering processes of 
radicalisation.  
 
In a 2012 study, a quantitative analysis examined whether Muslims living in five Western 
States, who experienced or perceived anti-Muslim discrimination, were more likely to 
support suicide bombing.
198
 The researchers concluded that Muslims’ perceptions of anti-
Muslim discrimination constituted a risk factor for such support,
199
 furthermore, 
emphasizing how “perceived discrimination among the diaspora population possibly 
enlarges the radicalized pool from which militants arise”.200 While the research referred to 
here accentuates that the correlation between perceived discrimination and support of 
suicide bombing was modest overall, it could nonetheless be suggested that subjective 
feelings of perceived discrimination may contribute to processes of radicalization.  
 
Furthermore, a notable finding in much of the revised research conducted on the existence 
of suspect communities; is the emphasis on how State suspicion generates alienation and 
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perceptions of being ostracized from the majority community. Research conducted by 
Blackwood on the psychological effects of counterterrorism measures demonstrates how 
Muslims that have experienced instances of misrecognition on basis of their religious 
affiliation has led to the feeling of being seen as a “disreputable and dangerous other”, 
which has been considered to prevent effective inclusion into the society at large.
201
 
Accordingly, it could be argued that the use of pre-emptive surveillance and its inherent 
categorization of risky identities based on ethnic or religious affiliation has the capacity to 
generate perceived discrimination to the extent that it becomes counterproductive for the 
objectives sought realized in relation to countering radicalization. While the work of the 
Police Security Service in part concerns monitoring groups that are considered susceptible 
to radicalization, it could be argued that the means employed potentially has the opposite 
effect. 
5.4 Conclusive remarks  
The consequences of the application of pre-emptive surveillance measures towards groups 
considered to inhabit risky identities on basis of their religious faith or ethnic origin are 
manifold. At best, the measures may prevent instances of criminal terrorist acts that would 
induce irreparable harm. However, as sought established in the preceding analysis, their 
application may also have unintended consequences, where the measures 
disproportionately affect particular groups.  
 
The chapter has attempted to demonstrate that the application of pre-emptive surveillance 
has the capacity to generate suspect communities, which may result in instances of indirect 
discrimination, as it is probable that it would be difficult for the State to sufficiently 
establish that the differential treatment generated has an objective and reasonable 
justification when founded on personal characteristics. It has been argued that the 
ramifications overt counterterrorism measures has on particular groups in society should be 
recognized as just as germane for the application of covert measures. Furthermore, such 
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measures may foster the development of alienation and resentment against the State, 
thereby precluding the Police Security Service’s strategy to effectively counter processes of 
radicalization.   
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6 Conclusion  
The scarcity of empirical evidence to substantiate the arguments proposed in this thesis 
prevents any definite conclusive answers. However, important observations can arguably 
be made on basis of the aforementioned analysis. Counterterrorism surveillance raises 
questions that are of central importance to the rule of law in a democratic State as Norway. 
This is particularly evident when such measures are applied pre-emptively. The 
contemporary advancement of proactive criminal law as a vital instrument in the global 
fight against terrorism has enabled an expansion in the scope of pre-emptive surveillance 
measures on low grounds of suspicion, thereby empowering the paradigm of prevention’s 
all-encompassing aim of effectively managing potential risks that have yet to materialise 
into criminal acts.  
 
A prevalent response to the heightened terrorist threat is the State’s declared need to 
balance individual human rights with national security objectives. However, the 
underpinning distributive implications that such balancing involves is insufficiently 
accentuated, thus precluding the public recognition that national security policies inevitably 
involves choices about how subsequent restrictions on rights are to be allocated. This 
tendency is further evident in the discourse on the potential ramifications that 
counterterrorism surveillance can have on society, as it arguably tends to be discussed 
within a framework of privacy rights, where the assumption is that everyone will be equally 
affected by the limitations necessitated by an exacerbated security climate. The challenges 
that pre-emptive surveillance may have on the protection afforded by the fundamental right 
to non-discrimination are thus under-communicated and the prospect for an informed 
debate about the implementation of such measures is arguably curtailed.  
 
An informed opinion about the effects of pre-emptive counterterrorism surveillance would 
acknowledge that the paradigm of prevention is premised on a prediction of future national 
security threats that uses ethnicity and religion as proxies for risk in order to identify 
potential terrorists. This thesis has argued and sought to demonstrate that this process 
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involves the designation of individuals with a particular religious belief or ethnic origin to 
inhabit risky identities, thus making them more easily subjected to pre-emptive surveillance 
measures. As the paramount threat to the national security of Norway is identified to 
emanate from extreme Islamism, Norwegian Muslims are as a result prone to become part 
of suspect communities, by virtue of their shared personal characteristics of religion or 
ethnicity. The disproportionate effects pre-emptive surveillance measures have on these 
groups could be seen to indicate that they are being subjected to instances of indirect 
discrimination. Additionally, as have been demonstrated, the disproportionate and 
discriminatory application of pre-emptive surveillance measures has the capacity to 
generate counterproductive corollaries that restrain the State in its efforts to effectively 
counter terrorism.  
 
The outlined challenges that pre-emptive surveillance measures can have on the right to 
non-discrimination should alarm any State that seeks to protect and ensure the fundamental 
ideals that human rights are founded upon, namely to guarantee the human dignity and 
equal rights of everyone.  
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